

~~TOP SECRET~~

16 June 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: [] AND []

SUBJECT : Summary of DDP/PBSUCCESS Meeting of 16 June 1954

1. Mr. Wisner advised that the news of the acquisition of F-47 aircraft by Somoza is incredibly good. The three aircraft have already completed the first leg of the journey to Somerset. It is anticipated that they will arrive there sometime on the afternoon of 17 June 1954. No action will be necessary on our part in regard to this matter.

2. We reviewed the cables which I carried to the DDP meeting with him and he acted upon the following:

a. Authorization was granted LINCOLN to activate Sante Fe as an adjunct to SHERWOOD. It was suggested, however, that LINCOLN give serious consideration to activating Sante Fe as an anti-Communist group heretofore not associated with Calligeris. The theme would be that this group has watched the development of events in Guatemala and has decided that SYNCARP will emerge victorious and they have decided to jump on the bandwagon.

b. In anticipation of the fact that LINCOLN might forward the Guatemalan request for authorization to use fragmentation bombs (see GUAT-856), DDP drafted a cable and telephoned Playdon advising that our position had not changed re utilization of this type armament.

c. LINC-3903 presented LINCOLN's analysis of the current situation in Guatemala and Honduras. In para 3, they in effect threw back to us the right to enter into the decision to execute or cancel PBSUCCESS. DDP indicated that paras 4 and 5 elaborated on para 3 but were not quite clear to him. He did offer the following guidance, however, "If it appears that to launch PBSUCCESS in the next few days would be an invitation to catastrophe, we should declare an hiatus and reevaluate our approach to the Guatemalan problem with an eye toward a long range type program, i.e., Lynade's paper."

d. Re LINCOLN's insistence that Page return to Guatemala, DDP concurred. He stated that in his opinion the Army is clearly to the situation and that now is the time to take a calculated risk with "eyes wide open" (Page's return to Guatemala).

3. FOR [] Request you have [] re-examine the Princep "manifest violation" in [] in view of determining whether we have submitted adequate reports to security and to DDP protecting our security interests.

4. Unless LINCOLN

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4. Unless LINCOLN calls the shot there will be no abatement in the effort to achieve the 18 June D-Day. Actually, there is little that we here can do now to provide guidance to LINCOLN. From this point on, our principle mission will be to provide administrative and technical support if and when it is requested.

J. D. ESTERLINE

JDE:mm

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